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Presidential Address 
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF 
VUOY K. 
I consider it a great privilege and 
pleasure to address you this morning as 
the next Presidentof the Indian Psychiatric 
Society. I am most grateful to the mem-
bership of the Society for having elected 
me to this highest position in the profe-
ssion at the national level, and for having 
bestowed this high honour upon me. I 
feel humble when I think of all the great 
stalwarts who have earlier served as Presi-
dents of the Society. Amongst this galaxy 
of luminaries arc my senior colleagues, 
mentors and friends. Since 1969, when 
I joined the Indian Psychiatric Society, 
I have been considerably involved with 
the organization of the Society and have 
had occasions to know and work with 
many of its Presidents. We are all aware 
of the enormous tasks before us in the 
Society, from improvement of mental 
health services to better training program-
mes and research into the various aspects 
of psychiatry and mental health. I look 
forward to your help and cooperation in 
trying to advance in these areas in the 
year of my Presidency. 
Many of you may have heard me in 
informal situations making a reference 
to professional brotherhood. The pro-
fessional fraternity, of which I am a mem-
ber, the fraternity of scientists and mental 
health professionals, is very important to 
me. Tne respect that you acquire from the 
professional brotherhood, '
:the Jury of the 
Peers" (and it includes Lady Peers also) 
is the ultimate arbitor of our professional 
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standing and of our very worth. Respect 
for the Jury of the Peers is of utmost im-
portance to us. 
INTRODUCTION 
More than other medical scientists, a 
psychiatrist must have a holistic vision, 
must see the human being as a whole. 
Most often, the psychiatrist has to be a 
generalist as regards the human situation. 
It is accordingly only appropriate for the 
psychiatrist to understand the process by 
which we assume and acquire knowledge 
about the external reality and as regards 
the human body and mind. 
Most scientists, including natural 
scientists, do not possess enough orienta-
tion to epistemology, as to how the know-
ledge that they deal with everyday is 
derived. Biological scientists possess even 
less information as biological sciences are 
considered to be less exact than physical 
and chemical sciences. In this regard, I 
may add that I have been fortunate in 
having the benefit of attending a series of 
thoroughly stimulating seminars on the 
philosophy of science at the University of 
Michigan over two decades ago presided 
over by Dr. Anatol Rapoport, a brilliant 
biological mathematician, whom I consi 
der as one of my intelligent Gurus. It was 
on this occasion that I had the privilege 
of reading Hans Reichenbach's highly 
insightful book, "The Rise of Scientific 
Philosophy", along with a number of 
other books on concepts that materially 
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altered my earlier naive understanding of 
the scientific process. A few years ago I 
had the privilege of reading Robert Pirsig's 
"Zen and the Art of Motor Cycle Mainte-
nance" which gave many insights and up-
set many existing notions, but more on 
this later. 
Epistemology is defined as the philo-
sophy ci' knowledge as to how knowlc-
ledge is acquired by studying the objective 
world around us. As an interested lay-
man, I possess a copy of Will Durant's 
classic "Tne Story of Pnilosophy". The 
very preface (to the second edition) of 
Durant's book deterred me as far as the 
whole area of epistemology is concerned. 
(Jailing it "that dismal science'' Durant 
refuses to offer any apology for the neglect 
of epistemology in his volume and further 
adds : "Doubtless now that epistemology 
is dying in Germany, it will be exported 
to America, as a fit return for the gift of 
democracy" (Durant, 1932, pp. xii-xiii). 
In the same vein he adds: "Now began 
the great game of epistemology, which ui 
LiebnUz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume and 
Kant waxed into a Three Hundred Years' 
War that at once stimulated and devas-
tated modern philosophy" (p- 151). 
It may be worthwhile here to exa-
mine the common sense approach to 
the preoption of the scientific process. 
As a budding scientist I used to think 
that the famous laws of physics and che-
mistry like the laws of gravity and motion, 
Charles's Law and Boyle's Laws were 
absolute and that the question of their 
fallibility did not arise, as though they 
were made in heaven, it was subse-
quently and mostly as a result of the 
influence of Reieheubach's book that I 
came to understand that it was not so that 
these so-called laws have been derived 
through a long process and have a certain 
(but not absolute) probability of being 
true. Alongside, I came to apperciate 
the limitations of the scientific approach 
and the empirical process. 
There is no a-priori reason why we 
human beings should be aware of the 
nature of the external reality and of caus-
ality. In the universe it is only human 
beings who possess some such knowledge 
and are able to, albeit to a limited degree, 
understand the nature of the universe 
around them, including its objects and 
phenomena, and are able to predict cer-
tain phenomena and develop a theory 
about it. There is no a-priori reason for 
acquisition of this knowledge, and as 
Bertrand Russel points our "cosmically 
and causally, knowledge is an unimpor-
tant feature of the universe" (Russel, 
1948 p. 9) and asks "... .how comes it 
that human beings, whose contacts with 
the worli are brief and personal and 
limited, are nevertheless able to know as 
much as they do know" (p. 5). 
To start with let us give a brief defini-
tion for science and an outline of the 
jcientific process. All of us have faced 
the problem of how to define science, 
ever since we started studying science. 
Many people define science as any syste-
matic and methodical study and some-
thing that unravels the mysteries of na-
ture. Science is an attempt to study 
natural phenomena, their nature and 
course, to classify them, to generalize about 
them, to predict about them, and thus to 
come up with a theory. 
"Science represents man's most per-
sistent effort to understand and organize 
knowledge by reasoned efforts that ulti-
mately depend on evidence that can be 
consensually validated" (Odeggard, 1986j. 
Einstc'n once characterised science as 
"nothing more than a refinement of every-
day thinking"' (Einstein, 1950, p. 59;. 
The concept of reality 
Before we come to the scientific pro-
cess, a few words about the concept of THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF 'MENTAL* PHENOMENA  5 
external reality and the concept and cau-
sality are important. There have been 
' two major approaches to the external 
reality. The Cartesian view originated 
from the famous philosopher Decartes, 
who said that the external reality exists 
only insofar as it is in the mind of the 
observer (the famous cognito ergo sum 
dictum of Descartes). As opposed to the 
Cartesian view has been the solikpsistic 
view which, in essence, says that there is 
an external reality out there, of which I 
may or may not be aware. Although my 
awareness may be limited, the external 
reality exists all the same. Empiricism 
sees'the role of observations as important 
in understanding the external reality. 
Rationalism perceives reason itself as the 
source of knowledge. 
The concept of causality 
The concept <^f causality has been 
one of the key concepts in the philosophy 
of science. Are natural phenomena ran-
dom happenings in the universe or do 
they follow certain laws ? Is there order 
in nature ? Immanuel Kant, the famous 
German philosopher, posited causality as 
one of the axioms, one of the synthetic a-
prioris alongwith the other two of time 
and space. The concept of causality and 
of determinism simply says that there is 
order in the universe and events occurring 
therein follow certain laws and are pre-
determined according to those. Aristotle 
classified four types of causes, namely 
material, efficient, formal and final. More 
recent, and what may be more applicable 
to the mental phenomena, is the distinc-
tion brtween causes and reasons, the for-
mer b-iing m^cha listic and the latter tele-
ological and anthropormorphic. 
THE SCIENTIFIC PROCESS 
With this background, let us look at 
the classical method and process of 
science. As we have seo'i, science is re-
lated to the study of nature and properties 
of objects and phenomena. What we call 
scientific has a certain general property. 
We know of the external world by the im-
pact it makes on our sensory system. The 
object or the phenomenon either registers 
on our sensory systems or produces certain 
other things or phenomena which register 
on our senses. Thus, although we do 
not see the force of gravity or an atom or 
even the molecular structure of a 
chemical or a substance, we do see chan-
ges or things attributable to these. How 
we know about gravity is well known. 
Molecular structure of chemicals is known 
through colour reactions or through X-ray 
crystallography. It is assumed that the 
impact on the sensory system would be 
pretty consistent and universal and would 
apply alike to all humans, thus giving 
rise to its consistency over time and repli-
cability. 
The classical scientific approach is 
called an inductivodeductive approach. 
We make certain observations in the uni-
verse, develop a hypothesis on the basis of 
that, make certain more observations to 
confirm or refute the hypothesis, reasoi 
out about the observations and draw cer-
tain deductions from it. Insofar as the 
deductions drawn can never be final, it 
raises futher questions which require fur-
ther induction to confirm or refute them. 
From hypotheses we move to theories and 
to laws of nature, each one increasingly 
more complex and at the same time more 
general and encompassing. 
The English school which has been 
mostly responsible for delineating the 
above process is called the Empiricist 
school, and the underlying philosophy is 
called Empiricism. A number of major 
philosophers of science : Francis Bacon, 
John Locke and David Hume are fore-
most amongst its proponents. The scienti-
fic process, as we generaly understand it, is 
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reliable across time, the place and obser-
vations thus should be objective. There 
may be other approaches to the discovery 
of the universe around us but that is not 
called scientific if we apply the narrow 
definition of science as here. The empiri-
cal scientific approach is characterised by 
the reliance on the sensory modalities 
for understanding the object and pheno-
mena around us. 
Criticism of Inductivism 
There have been three major criti-
cisms of the inductive, empirical approach 
as outlined above. 
Fistly, our sensory organs of percep-
tion are both limited and fallible. The 
sensory organs are very much limited as 
far as the phenomena in the universe are 
concerned. Our eyes see and ears hear 
only a very limited range of waves of 
electromagnetic frequencies. We do not 
hear anything if the wave frequency runs 
below or above a relatively narrow range 
(for example, we do not hear the dog 
whistle). At the same time, our sensory 
organs suffer from sensory illusions. It is 
clear that our perceptions arc very much 
coloured not only by the field in which 
the sensory stimulants operate but also 
by our mental set or attitude. As Acker-
man (1965) has summarised "the existence 
of illusion or conflicting reports from the 
senses, proves .. that the senses cannot 
l>e trusted to provide knowledge in their 
sense" (p. 16). 
The second set of criticism to induc-
tivism is that induction is not possible 
without hypotheses and axioms, assump-
tions and schemata. Russel (1948) also 
alluded to it in the following summation 
"Knowledge, in my opinion, is a much less 
precise concept than is generally thought, 
and has its roots more deeply embedded in 
wwrbiilized unimal behaviour than most 
philosophers have been willing to admit" 
(p. 13, italics added]. 
"Empiricism pre-supposes that one 
can apprehend the real world independ-
ently of hypotheses and axioms" (Wallace, 
1988a j. Chalmers has pointed out, ". . the 
inductivist is wrong on two counts . . 
theory of some kind precedes all obser-
vation statements, and observation state-
ments do not constitute a firm basis .. 
because they are fallible" (Chalmers, 
1976, p.30). 
The next criticism of inductivism is on 
account of limitations in drawing inferen-
ces out of a limited number of observa-
tions. The scientist studies a particular 
sample and on the basis of his observations, 
he draws inferences about the total popu-
lation- It is sobering to note that even 
David Hume, one of the founders of em-
piricism, contended that "even after the 
observation of the frequent or constant 
conjunction of objects. We have no rea-
son to draw any inference concerning any 
object beyond those of which we have had 
an experience" (Hume, 1939, p. 165). 
Karl Popper, perhaps the greatest philos-
opher of science, pointed out that no mat-
ter how large the number of hitherto 
supporting observations, this amount, 
when compared with the infinity of con-
ceivable, future situations, approaches 
zero probability (Popper, 1965). "The 
history of science furnishes one refutation 
after another of supposedly iron-clad in-
ductively derived truths" (Wallace, 
1988a). As Chalmers (L976, p.33) has 
summarised : "The main reason why I 
think inductivism should be abandoned 
is that, compared with rival and more 
modern approaches it has increasingly 
failed to throw new and interesting light 
on the nature science". In the same way, 
Chalmers has reasoned : "die probabi-
lity of the universal generalization being 
true is thus finite number divided by an 
infinite number, which remains zero 
however much the finite number of obser-
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is increased" (Chalmers, 1976, p.17). 
So, where we do go from here ? 
Does it mean that induction has no rele-
vance ? In view of the limitations of the 
inductive approach, the concept of positi-
vity came about. A posit is a statement 
with a defined, but not absolute, probabi-
lity of being true. To give an example, 
let us look at the statement, "Man is 
mortal". It has been estimated that 
since the beginning of evolution about 
sixty five billion human beings have been 
born on this earth. Out of them, five 
billion are still living and the remaining 
sixty billion have died. Man is mortal 
cannot be definitely said regarding the 
five billion were still living and hence, 
"man is mortal" has a 12/13 chances of 
being true. 
The other Approaches to Epistemo-
logy 
We can perhaps briefly address to 
the other approaches that have been 
brought forward in view of the limitations 
of the inductive approach. 
Falsificationism : This approach, 
which isgerierally associated with the name 
of Popper briefly states that the job of the 
scientist is to refute theories and that 
science advances by replacement of falsi-
fied theories by yet to be falsified ones 
(Popper, 1968 ; Wallace, 1988a). Accor-
ding to Popper, it is the job of a scientist 
to attack and to falsify a theory and that 
science advances only in this manner. 
The merit of a scientific theory is not in 
what it predicts will happen but what it 
predicts will not happen, how it limits 
certain things from happening. The 
more falsifiable a theory is and the more it 
constrains the phenomena, the better it 
>s. The hypotheses which are not falsi-
fiable are just not within the realm of 
scientific pursuits. The aim of science is 
to falsify theoires and to replace them by 
better theories. 
The objection to and limitation of 
falsificanism is roughly the same as in 
case of inductivism. One needs to proceed 
along the same empiricist and inductive 
approach to falsify a theory as much as to 
prove it and it accordingly suffers from 
the same limitations of empiricism that we 
have earlier discussed. Popper even con-
siders somebody's approach to disprove a 
theory as a contribution to the develop-
ment of that theory. One major pro-
blem in falsificanism is that, like ind-
uctivism, a part of the complex test 
situation involved in observation can be 
wrong and can result in erroneous pre-
diction (Chalmers, 1976, p.61). "An 
embarrassing historical fact for falsifica-
tionists is that if their methodology had 
been strictly adhered to by scientists then 
those theories generally regarded as being 
among the best examples of scientific the-
ories would never have been developed 
because they would have been rejected in 
their infancy" (Chalmers, 1976, p.63). 
The paradigm approach: The para-
digm approach is related to the name of 
Thomas S. Kuhn. Kuhn openly admits that 
no unbiased observation is possible and that 
observation depends on a paradigm. Kuhn 
(1970) came to realize that traditional 
accounts of science, whether inductivist or 
falsificationist, do not bear self-comparison 
with historical evidence. According to 
him, a mature science is governed by a 
single paradigm. A paradigm is a must 
for a science and it is this characteristic 
that distinguishes science from non-science-
In the course of the development of a 
particular science, a time comes when the 
paradigm hitherto adhered to does not 
serve the purpose any more and it has 
to be discarded for a totally new way of 
looking at—a new paradigm. According 
to Kuhn (1970, 1977) science advances 
through the revolutionary overthrow of 
one scientific paradigm by another, and 
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timi-honoured scientific theory in favour 
of another incompatible with it" (Kuhn, 
1970, p.6>. Paradigm is a sign of matu-
rity in the development of any given 
scientific field. 
Kuhn argues that no natural h'story 
can be interpreted in the absence of at least 
som" inol'cit body of inter-twined theore-
tical and methodical belief. If that be-
lief is riot already implicit, it must be ex-
ternally supplied by a current metaphysic, 
by another science, or by personal or 
historical accident (Kuhn, 1970, pp. 16-
17). 
In the course of development out of 
the various paradigms one emerges as 
clearly hotter than its competitors. It is 
that paradigm which >s to be accepted. 
Kuhn quotes Francis Bacon (1969, p. 
210} as having sa'd "truth emerges more 
readily from error than from confusion". 
Relativism-Subjectivism: In view 
of the problems in inductive approach, rela-
tivism-subjectivism accents the role of the 
inv;stigator's preconceptions and subjec-
tivity. The relativist-subjectivist makes no 
assumption of pure objectivity and asserts 
that one cannot comprehend the real 
world independently of hypotheses and 
axioms and a subjective b'as may always 
be present. Popper (1979) spoke of evolu-
tio-wily determined "anticipatory theo-
ries" that are ''genetically incorporated" 
into the sensory organs of all members of 
the animal kingdom. Psychologically and 
anthropologically, wc know that even 
stark perception • or sensations are gover-
ned by assumptions and schemata (Wal-
lace, 1988a). Tims a subjective bias is 
present in all observations. 
Anarchist Theory : This theory, 
which goes by the name of P. Feyerabend 
(1975) denies that there is something intri-
nsically special about science and that there 
is an objective scientific method. He con-
siders the high status attributed to science 
in a modern society to be unjustified. 
To him. a scientific theory is like an ideo-
logy or religious belief system : like works 
of art and aesthetic judgement or a mat-
ter of taste. Just like you cannot say that 
a particular painting is more true than 
the other or a particular religious system 
is closer to the ultimate reality or truth, 
the same way a scientific theory is not 
superior to any other. He even argues 
that the scientific theory enters "a com-
plex discussion involving conflicting pre-
ferences and propaganda" (p.366) and 
that "what remains are aesthetic judge-
ments, judgements of taste, metaphysical 
prejudices, religious desires, in short, what 
remains are our subjective wishes" (p. 285, 
Feyerabend's italics). He concludes that 
there is not a shade of argument that 
modem science is superior to magic or to 
Aristotelian science. 
Intersectionalism : More recently, 
Edwin R. Wallace, IV, has brought for-
ward anintersectional approach to science. 
According to him human behaviour is 
determined through an intersection bet-
ween the antecedent state including the 
constitutionally and historically deter-
mined conscious and unconscious desires, 
fears, inhibitions, and mode of interpre-
ting the world and the immediately pre-
cedent situation, that is the current en-
vironment (Wallace, 1986). The resul-
ting behaviour may vary according to the 
modifications in each of the above. Even 
given the fixity of the antecedent state, 
the resulting behaviour may differ accor-
ding to alterations in the immediately 
precedent situation. "In sofar as our 
behaviour is not externally compelled oi 
constrained it is free ; as a function of our 
history and personality structure, it is de-
termined" (Wallace. 1986). The human 
behaviour is determined by the "the 
sort of person I was and the sort of situa-
tion I faced". He makes a point that 
although human behaviour is determined, 
it is not predetermined and it does not 
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determinism negate the importance of cons-
cious efforts, attitudes, deliberations, and 
volition" (Wallace, 1986; Wallace's italics). 
He believes that autonomy, internal locus of 
control and capacity for self-transcendence 
are fully permissible in a deterministic 
universe and he sees the reduction of deter-
minism as originating from its violation 
of "man's narcisistic presumption to rise 
above the causal nexus" (Wallace, 1986) • 
He further perceives the cause-effect 
relationship as a continuous process in 
time. "That reality is a continuum which 
cause and effect explanations arbitrarily 
segment into a series of temporally and 
specially frozen events" (Wallace, 1988b). 
As early as 1896, Freud invoked an intcr-
sectional concept of causality (Freud, 
1896, p.217). In a way, it contrasts with 
one usual concept of causality as given 
by Mandelbaunrs (1977, pp. 47-77) as 
"the end point of a process, of which the 
effect is viewed as its end point or result: 
the cause of this result is the process itself". 
As Wallace (1987) summed up : 
"Psychoanalysis, like evolution and other 
grand theories of science, is assessed 
by data derived from various sources, it 
is the convergence or divergence of multi-
ple lines of evidence that gives the verdict. 
We do not require certainty". 
The Theories of Truth 
One way of looking at science is that 
it is an approach to arrive at the true pic-
ture of nature. Science, thus, is an unen-
ding search for the truth- The truth or 
otherwise of any scientific theory or pro-
posed law has to be established. There 
are four basic ways of looking at the con-
cept of truth in the context of scientific 
pursuit. 
1 - Correspondence Theory : This 
theory is basjd o i empirical criteria. Ob-
servations are used to establish whether a 
particular theory is true or not and the 
u-itl i.idu-uivo-dttducti've process is used 
to arrive at the truth of the theory. In 
brief, it can be said that "true propositions 
faithfully represent the structure of the 
reality to which they refer: "a statement is 
true if it corresponds to the facts', as 
Popper (1962, p.376) tersely put it" 
(Wallace, 1988a). A statement is true if 
it corresponds to the facts. It is nearer 
to the truth (i.e. has more "truth con-
tent") than another statement if it corres-
ponds to the facts more closely than the 
other statement (Popper, 1962, p. 376). 
2. Coherence Theory: This is based 
on the logical criteria. A theory is true if 
the elements of it are related to each 
other by ties of logical implications. 
3. Truth as Aesthetic and Prag-
matic: This theory acknowledges that 
there is no absolute route to truth in scien-
tific investigations. However, whether a 
theory is accepted or not depends upon the 
possible gains from it. Based to a certain 
degree on the Feyerabandian anarchist the-
ory, a theory is true "as long as it is pretty 
and helps somebody" (Wallace, 1988). 
4. Truth as the absolute, ultimate, 
undeniable reality : We do not have to 
prove the existence or otherwise of truth. 
Is there any ultimate nature and structure 
of the universe in which we live, and is 
there any theory and spirit guiding this 
reality ? As children when we started stud-
ying science, we learnt that we must pur-
sue and establish the truth as if truth de-
pends upon our providing it. The Hindu 
concept is very clear in this matter that 
there is an absolute and undeniable truth 
and reality, whether we can see it or not. 
EPISTEMOLOGY OF MENTAL 
PHENOMENA 
When we try to look at the process 
of knowledge as far as the behavioura 
sciences are concerned, we immediately 
come face to face with the problem of the 
concept of mind. We can surmise of mind 
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that we ascribe to the minds. For most of 
human history, it has been the heart 
and not the brain that has been conside-
red to be the seat of the mind. We know 
of mind only through its behavioural 
correlates. "We know the mind, said 
Hume, only as we know matter : by per-
ception, though it be in this case internal. 
Never do we perceive any such entity as 
the "mind" : we perceive merely separate 
ideas, memories, feelings, etc . ." (Durant, 
1952, p.257). 
Classically, in the modern times, cog-
nition, conation and affect have been 
considered as the major constituents of 
the functions of mind. The term men-
tal includes all of these and also a num-
ber of other functions, phenomena and 
manifestations which seem related to the 
mind but which do not easily seem im-
plied in the above throe-way classifica-
tion. This may include such things as 
dreams, autochthonous thoughts, after 
images, revelations, faith, etc. 
Mind-Matter & Mind-Body Problems 
Any discussion of the epistemology 
of behavioural and mental phenomena 
immediately runs into the concept and 
definition of mind- The Western'philos-
ophy has been plagued for over 2,000 
years with the dualistic theory of mind vs. 
matter. Is mind a part of matter or is it 
something separate ? "What we term 
'mind' is an abstraction that refers to 
the organization of those properties which 
emerge from the interaction between two 
species of rn'itter— the human body and 
its environment" (Wallace, 1985, p. 165). 
The Indian philosophy has, by and 
large stayed out of the mind-matter con-
troversy. Matter is only a product of our 
ignorance ; our inability to see Brahman. 
Matter has a certain qaality and disposi-
tion (Up-iihi) whereas the mind is Upadhi-
less. 
Truth is not debatable in the Indian 
thought and it is only a construct based 
on our culture's construct. Truth, in the 
Indian belief, is transcendant and non-
human-
The Indian philosophy lias been basi-
cally monistic as far as the mind-matter 
relationship and the mind-body problem 
is concerned. It does not say that mind 
and matter are the same, but it does not 
appreciate the nature of the problem 
either and discards it as irrelevant. 
One Indian approach has been the 
approach of the Sankhya philosophy which 
makes a distinction between prakriti and 
purasha. Purasha is the pure consciousness 
and reflects bv.dd.hi whereas prakriti is abso-
lute, capable of cognition and not simply 
a product of purasha. 
The Indian philosophy very well 
appreciates the qualities and properties of 
objects. In this way, it is antethetical 
to the Western characteristation of an 
object which is basically analytical and 
chemical. Indian philosophy recognises 
seven qualities of an object, namely, 
Dravya, Guna, Karma, Samanya, Vishesh, 
Prabhav and Samvaya. 
Causality and Determinism in 
Psychology 
"Medicinehas long possessed a primi-
tive concept of psychic causality—of the 
influence of ideas and emotions on health 
and disease" (Wallace, 1985, p. 132). 
Schopenhauer espoused a determinism 
in the psychological sphere identical to 
that in the physical (Wallace, 1985, p. 
138). John Stuart Mill, who wrote exten-
sively on many subjects and who is suppo-
sed to have been one of the most intelli-
gent men who ever lived, attributed to the 
concept of determinism , "the existence of 
universal laws for the Formation of Charac-
ter" (Mill, 1969, p.14). Tylor (1874, 
vol, I, p .2) who has been called the father 
of cultural anthropology maintains that 
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with laws as definite as those which govern 
the motion of waves, the combination of 
acids and bases and growth of plants a
vtd 
animals". 
Although Freuds' concept of deter-
minism had its predecessors, "the explana-
tion of Schopenhauer and Herbart, 
none of his precursors had a developed 
conception of unconscious motives" 
(Wallace, 1985, p. 141) and causal con-
cepts were too mechanistic. 
Freud has been criticised for his 
concept of psychic determinism. As we 
well kaow, psychic determinism and un-
conscious were the two basic concepts on 
which the entire theory of psycho-analysis 
was based. We now know that Freud 
did not discover either of these and that 
the concept of unconscious enjoyed con-
siderable currency in Freud's days. With 
regard to determinism, what Freud did 
was to extrapolate the concept of deter-
minism from the physical, natural sciences 
to the science of mind. In other words, if 
we accept that the physical events are 
not random happenings in the universe, 
but are caused by certain other events, 
there is no reason why mental phenomena 
are also not random happenings but are 
caused accidentally- Accordingly, Freud 
only extended the concept of determinism 
to the mental phenomena. 
If we look at the concept of deter-
minism even in the physical world, the 
concept of causality, and determinism was, 
to start with, taken from the mental world. 
The concept of causality was, to a con-
siderable degree, an anthropomorphic 
concept. It was as if the metals and ele-
ments had a m'nd of their own and that 
their behaviour was purposive and teleo-
logical. The stone fell because it wanted 
to unite with the centre of the earth, 
plants grow upward to reach the source 
of light, elements attract each other or 
repel each other, etc. Such a "primitive 
notion of psychic causality was the first 
conception of causality" (Wallace, 1985, 
p. 117). The actions of one element upon 
others have been referred to as injustices. 
Strong (1978, p. 115) defines causa-
tion in psychology in the following terms : 
"A cause is an event that precedes the 
event of interest and that can be shown 
to have an invariant relationship to the 
event". 
The concept of causality has given 
rise to so many problems that Bertrand 
Russel (1929) advocated its "complete 
extrusion from the philosophical vocabu-
lary", Wittgenstein (1967) considered 
causation as superstitious and Reiner 
(1932, pp. 709-710) charged that causa-
tion is an anthropomorphic concept which 
"ceases to exist in physics". 
Role of Introspection and Intuition 
Introspection and intuition have 
always been considered as legitimate me-
thods of knowing about the mind. In 
a way, we can say that from the sample 
of one (ourselves), we can generalize 
about the entire population of mankind. 
We may say that the sample of one is 
totally inadequate for the entire human 
race. Such a small sample would not be 
acceptable to a scientist. However, there 
is one aspect of this issue that is worth 
keeping in mind. In considering some 
other natural phenomenon, the pheno-
menon to be observed lies outside us. We 
do not have any direct method of learning 
about it and, hence, a large sample is 
required to rectify the error of observa-
tion. There is no fool-proof method by 
which we can learn about the event. 
However, in trying to understand the wor-
king of our own mind, this aspect of the 
error of observation is removed. As wc 
are the observers and the observed at the 
same time, we can be sure that wc know 
what is actually going on as far as the 
phenomenon to be observed is concerned. 
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tion have been well recognised as methods 
in human psychology. It was Fechner, 
during the second half of the 19th century, 
who, for the first time, suggested that there 
was no reason why psychological events 
also did not follow the laws of physics and 
chem'stry. This was a major turning 
point in the history of psychology. Sub-
sequently, although Freud added impetus 
to this scientific approach of the study of 
m'ud, in fact, he depended greatly on 
intuitive and introspective processes in 
developing a theory of psyche and persona-
lity. His study was also allegorical which 
i-i consistent with the accepted pattern 
then prevalent. In evaluating the contri-
butions of Freud, we must keep in mind 
that in his time intuitive and introspec-
tive approaches were well acceptable as 
scientific methods in psychology and that 
although he elaborated greatly on the con-
cepts of unconscious and psychic deter-
minism (causality) ; lie was by no means 
its founder. Russell (19+8) calls absurd 
the view muntiined by ''a certain school 
of psychologists, who maintain that' intros-
pection' is not a valid scientific method" 
(p. ">9) and he iniintains that "Introspec-
tion is valid as a source of data, and is to 
a c> isiderable extent am liable to scienti-
fic controls" (p.65). As Ackerman (1965) 
has pointed out, ''just as there are objects 
which the senses experience, so there are 
objects which the m'nd experiences" 
(p.18). 
The role of intuition in science has 
b;en far greater than is commonly belie-
ved. It is singularly important in deve-
loping hypotheses. "The formation of 
hvpothescs is the ra«ist mysterious of all 
the categories of scientific method" (Pirsig, 
1974. p. 106p- Evon Einstein has Said: 
"Man tries to make for himself, in the 
fashio l that suits him best, a simplified 
ail i itelligible picture of the world. .. . 
in order to find in this way the peace and 
serenity .. The surpreme task ,. is to 
arrive at those universal elementary laws 
from which the cosmos can be built up by 
pure deduction" (cited in Pirsig, 1974, p. 
106). Is it that the scientific laws are more 
convenient than true ? Regarding the 
role of intuition in the formulation of 
these laws, Einstein adds, "There is no 
logical path to these laws : only intuition, 
resting on sympathetic understanding of 
experience, can reach them .. (cited in 
Pirsig, 1974, pp. 106-107). 
Wc have to depend upon introspec-
tion for a number of psychological pheno-
mena. The classical example given in 
this regard is that of after-image. If you 
look at a bright object for some time and 
then suddenly dose your eyes, you "see" 
an outline of the object in complementary 
colour. There is no way how this ex-
perience can be objectively and empiri-
cally validated. The empirical approach 
requires that the phenomenon should be 
sitn'larly perceived by outside, indepen-
dent raters, thus giving it replicabilityand 
consistency. Similarly, phenomena like 
hallucinations (i.e. sensations in the 
absence of an external stimulus) and even 
pain can be perceived only at the indivi-
dual, intuitive level. Does it make it any 
less real ? 
Another important problem in the 
study of the mental phenomena is that the 
very process of observation may influence 
the event. A simple example could be 
that if the people are aware that they are 
being observed, this knowledge itself may 
affect their behaviour. This problem has 
been encountered in many experiments in 
social psychology and the question is how 
to make the observation unobtrusively. A 
related and more serious problem's where 
the process of drawing one's observation 
towards it may result in the cessation of 
the phenomenon to be observed. 
The classical example given here is 
the debate regarding the wave theory vs 
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cess of observation is such that it will dis-
turb the phenomenon so that an answer to 
this question cannot be found. It is one 
of the'indeterminate' questions. Coming 
to the psychic events, a very ready exam-
ple is that of dreams. If one were to focus 
conscious attention on dreams, the focus 
would bring about a cessation of the dream 
activity itself. There is reason to believe 
that the mental activities that occur in the 
process of falling asleep and the process 
of waking up from sleep may throw im-
portant light on the mental operations. 
Many people commonly experience frag-
mented or what has been called auto-
chthonous dtoughts or perceptions during 
the half-awake-half-aslcep state. However, 
again, focussing attention to it will bring 
about a cessation oi these phenomena. So, 
how must one study it ? 
For mental operations to be empiri-
cally studied, it would require that the 
phenomenon is perceived and reported by 
the person. However, although a person 
may introspectively experience something, 
he may not always be able to experience 
it in words which would be essential for 
others to comprehend the phenomenon-
Unless the above occurs, the empirical 
validity cannot be reached- What hap-
pens if the person is unable to express 
the experience in words ? There may be a 
number of mystical experiences which 
cannot be translated into words. Although 
the experiences which are common may 
have a vocabulary for their expression, 
the same cannot be said about unusual 
or idiosyncratic experiences. A colle-
ague of mine is very fond of giving the 
following analogy : ' "How would a dumb 
person relate his experience on eating 
sweet ?'' (Wig, personal communication). 
INDIAN APPROACHES TO THE 
EPISTEMOLOGY OF MENTAL 
PHENOMENA 
Although it is not the purpose of this 
discourse to talk in detail about the Indian 
approaches to epistemology and this talk 
cannot do justice to the richness of Indian 
philosophical approaches to the above, 
perhaps certain points of departure from 
the Western approach can be taken note 
of. The following points may be consi-
dered in this respect : 
(1) Mind-Matter duality 
As opposed to much of the Western 
thought the mind-matter duality, which 
has plagued the Western thought for 
over 2000 years, does not exist in Indian 
philosophy. In a way, mind is also a 
part of matter and there is a continuous 
ongoing intercourse between the two. 
The observer is not separate from the ob-
served. The two are engaged in conti-
nuous interaction- Since the Western 
thought maintains a duality between the 
observer and the observed, objectivity 
assumes great importance. In Indian 
philosophy, it is accepted that an obser-
vation cannot be fool proof. The purpose 
of the conjunction of the seer with the 
seen is for unfolding inherent powers of 
nature and spirit so that the seer disco-
vers his own true nature. 
As we have seen earlier, the Indian 
approach is monistic, aduaiia. It is true 
that the samkhya philosophy maintains a 
distinction between the prakriii andpurasha 
and is a philosophy of pluralistic dualism; 
by and large, Indian philosophy remains 
monistic. 
(2) Synthetic, holistic 
In contrast to the Western analytical 
approach to recognition and theorizing, 
the Indian approach is synthetic and holis-
tic. In the Western approach, if you are 
trying to understand something you must 
break it in two parts. Your break some-
thing into two ; if you still do not under-
stand, break it into halves again and keep 
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This has resulted in the Western approach 
to identify the key attributes and active 
ingredients of substances and phenomena. 
In Western science, the active ingre-
dient in most situations has been identified 
in chemical rather than physical terms 
and thus does not pay adequate attention 
to the -state" of the thing. For example, 
iron is iron irrespective of its shape. HsO 
represents water whether it is in the shape 
of water or ice or steam and whether water 
is stagnant in a poad or ru-ining water 
in a river. Alcohol is C2H5OH irrespec-
tive of the type of alcoholic beverage. 
Now a person who is savouring a rather 
rare scotch will be aghast if yoti say that 
he is drinking G2rI,OH and thus some-
thing similar to tiie cheapest gin or arrack. 
Tne Indian concept of external reality-
has always been holistic and it is well 
documented in the ancient scriptures like 
Gita and Patanjali Yoga Sutra in which 
the shape and the state of the object have 
all bjen taken into account The Western 
approach to identifying the essential in-
gredients also serves some purpose as it 
describes the object substantially but cer-
tainly not totally. 
The Indian approach to science has 
also seen causality in the holistic fashion. 
As regards time, it is somewhat akin to 
Wallace's concept in that there is a con-
tinuous change of cause and effect. It 
also sees causality in a multifactorial 
way in wliich the entire system is interac-
ting with each other to produce the effects. 
(3) IUusionary nature of per-
ception 
Tne Indian philosophy also is cogni-
sant of the lim'tations of perceptions and 
the inferences to be drawn from it. The 
Srimad Bhagwat Gita attests to the illusio-
nary character of human perceptions, 
as does Patanjali Sutra. There is no 
fool-proof method of seeing the external 
reality. Identifying the seer with the 
instrument of seeing, namely, the senses of 
perception and organs of action intelli-
gence and ego is considered as asmita or 
egoism, and hence should be avoided. 
(4) Non-normative approach to 
human behaviour 
One of the definitions of health and 
illness is a statistical one, a normative 
approach. If you are like everybody else, 
you arc all right. The usual is normal 
and healthy. Any deviation from the 
statistical approach is viewed with sus-
picion and is a prima facie evidence of 
abnormality. 
However, the Indian approach to 
mind is aware of the differences across 
individuals and across time. It attests to 
a number of reasons for such variability, 
evoking concepts like sanskara and fatalism 
which may limit and prescribe what a 
particular individual may perceive-
However, it is clear that perceptions 
may vary not only across individuals but 
in the same individual from time to time. 
Many of the things that occur to us can-
not be called usual by any means. Let 
us look at the creative process. We all 
know that scientists have flashes of crea-
tive insight. This does not occur every-
day ; in fact, it will not occur more than 
a few times in one's lifetime. This can, 
in no way, be called abnormal or patho-
logical. Similarly, there arc such things 
as religious revelations or ilham. So are 
other para-normal perceptions that can 
occur to some but not to all. 
The Indian philosophy attests to 
the variability across individuals and the 
idiosyncratic nature of many mental 
phenomena. There is a greater aware-
ness of such possibilities and of its aware-
ness. 
(5) From causes to consequences 
Like me, others who began their 
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the University of Michigan in the early 
1960s were fam'liar with the famous 
aphorism of Ralph Gerard who directed 
the Schizophrenia Project in the 1950s : 
"Not a crooked thought without a croo-
ked neuron." The converse of it, its 
corollary, is however not so well appre-
ciated: 
"Not a crooked neurone without a 
crooked thought". It is inconceivable that 
if you believe in the former, you can re-
ject the latter. So, what do we have here ? 
We are actually moving from theory of 
causality to that of consequences. Every 
event in the universe, howsoever trivial, 
will have its consequences. It also 
applies to our thoughts, emotions, words 
and deeds over which we seem to have 
some control. If we engage in wrong-doing, 
we will have to face its consequences. 
If we extend this concept, we will no 
doubt realize that we are talking about a 
karma theory. People generally think that 
many acts are finite and delimited as long 
as no one knows about it. You can cheat 
or steal or engage in a sexual escapade as 
long as no one knows about it. How would 
anyone know about it, after all ? We 
know, as a theoretical possioility, what 
Julius Caesar said 2000 years ago can be 
retrieved even now. The energy change 
has taken place ; it is up to us to retrieve 
this information. A simple analogy comes 
to mind. In India, even now when one 
makes a subscriber trunk dialing (STD) 
telephone call, it is counted as so many 
local calls, and there is no record who was 
the party called, what time the call was 
made and its duration. But, the tele-
phone company can easily eavesdrop on 
it by hooking your telephone to a com-
puter and come up with all the data ; 
something that is routinely done in many 
advanced countries. The point I am 
trying to make is that, it is theoretically 
possible to record every event in the uni-
verse. Simply because a thing is not re-
corded does not make it a non-event and 
does not subtract from its causal proper-
ties. 
The above may be theoretically 
applicable also to events that are not 
possible to record or measure at present. 
What about the consequences of dallying 
in the titillating enjoyment of a porno-
graphic book, or of having uttered an 
obscenity ! If we believe in causality and 
consequences, these will also have their 
impacts. 
In a way, the Karma theory is related 
also to the sanskara theory and the free-
will-determinism issues. Your sanskara is 
determined by your good deeds and mis-
deeds in the previous births and are pas-
sed on to you with re-birth. If the body is 
burnt, how can these be transmitted ? 
Again, we are running into the fallacy that 
we have been trying to avoid, namely 
that everything is important, whether you 
can measure it, record it or not. If you 
have committed mis-deeds earlier, you are 
born with tainted wisdom which will 
impair your ability to do good deeds. But 
it is a must to try your best to do good 
deeds, otherwise, you cannot rise from 
the morass. 
The above is also related to the free 
will vs. determinism issue. We have seen 
how complicated the issue of determinism 
is, especially pertaining to mental acts. 
The Indian ethos, like virtually all religious 
belief systems in the world, is ambivalent 
on the issue. Determinism is related to 
fatalism, but you have freedom of choice 
as well. If you aie born with bad sanskara 
and wisdom, your capacity for good deeds 
is limited, but still you must try your best 
to elevate your position through good 
deeds. 
One important point regarding 
Indian, especially Hindu philosophy. We 
have seen the difference between the 
mechanistic, pushing causes and techno-
logical, anthropomorphic, pulling rca-16  VyOY K. VARMA 
sons. Indian philosophy accepts the 
above, the purposefulness of the reasons. 
However, there is also the concept of 
kaaran. It will again have to be transla-
ted as "reason", but it is not the reason 
as we have discussed above. Kaaran is a 
cosmic causality how the event fits in 
liod's scheme of things, God who is per-
ceived as the cause of it all : Sakal Jagat 
ke kaaramam. 
(6; Contemplative, participant 
approach 
Finally, the Indian approach to 
science is basically contemplative, as op-
posed t<> the aggressive, manipulative 
Western approach. We try to understand 
nature, for its own sake and to adapt 
ourselves to it, rather than to meddle with 
it. We are not masters of the universe, 
but only participants. Tne aggressive, 
miriipulative, exploitative approach to 
nature is already having a large number 
of repercussions. Furthermore, unfor-
tunately, we do not k'tow all the possible 
repercussions of our meddling with 
nature. 
UMHATIONS OF THE SCIENTIFIC 
APPROACH 
As we have seen, each one of the 
various scientific approaches has its limi-
tations. Popper admits the limitations 
and fall lability of the scientific approach 
and emphasizes it with a striking meta-
phor : 
"Tne empirical basis of objective 
science has thus nothing "absolute" 
about it. Science does not rest upon 
solid bedrock. Tne bold structure of 
its theories rises, as it were, above a 
swamp. It is like a building erected 
on piles. The piles are driven down 
from above into the swamp, but not 
down to any natural or "given" 
base ; and if we stop driving the piles 
deeper, it is not because we have 
reached firm ground. We simply 
stop when we are satisfied that the 
piles are firm enough to carry the 
structure, at least for the time being 
(Popper, 1968, p. lllj. 
Popper fur titer writes ".. if we expect 
truth we must search for it by persistently 
searching for our errors : by indefatiga-
ble rational criticism, and self-criticism" 
(Popper, 1968, p. 3) and further adds 
'.. my answer to the question, "How do 
you know ? Wiiat is the source or the 
basis of your assertion ? What observa-
tions have led you to it ?"' would be : 
i;I do not know : my assertion was merely 
a guess. Never mind the source, or the 
sources, from which it may spring—there 
are many possible sources, and I may not 
be aware of half of them; and the origins 
or pedigrees have in any case little bear-
ing on truth. But if you are interested 
in the problem which I tried to solve by 
my tentative assertion, you may help me by 
criticising it as severely as you can; and 
if you can design some experimental test 
which you think might refute my asser-
tion, I shall gladly, and to the best of 
my powers, help you to refute it" (Pop-
per, 1968, p. 21). 
Tne modern approach to science 
depends greatly on measurement. Sam-
pooran Singh ^The Sunday Tribune, 
September 18, 1988) quotes R. D. Laing, 
a renowned psychiatrist, as lamenting the 
obsession of the scientist with ''measure-
ment and quantification" and physical 
science being concerned with a world of 
shadows and falling into the error of 
identifying appearance with reality. 
Sampooran Singh maintains that the 
concepts are not features of reality but 
constructs of the mind; part of the map, 
not of territory. Science seems to miss 
many important things, for example, the 
language of love and friendship and mut-
ual understanding. 
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referred to another mode of knowing 
that does not update by separating the 
subject and the object (Sampooran 
Singh, 1936). Such a mode of knowing 
is of course well appreciated in the Indian 
scientific tradition. 
Chalmers (1976, p.xiv) quotes an 
inscription of the social science research 
building at the University of Chicago as 
reading "If you cannot measure, your 
knowledge is m:agre and unsatisfactory". 
Toulmin f 1976) points out that Heraclitus 
argued that sensory observation always 
hold good for particular, specific times 
and places. All our resulting knowledge 
must, as a result, be correspondingly 
''contingent"—that is local, transcendatory 
and conditional in its scope and validity. 
Heraclitus accordingly formulated his 
much quoted epigram "everything is in 
flux" (p. 73). 
In a way our difficulty can be summed 
up as per the following scheme : 
"All of our knowledge of the world 
comes by way of the five senses. 
So, all of our knowledge of the world 
is contingent; 
So, we can make no necessary or 
permanent assertions about anything 
in the world—even about words and 
their meanings; So, language is "in 
flux"—from place to place and mo-
ment to moment—like everything 
else; 
So, we cannot use language intelli-
gibly.', 
But the fact is : 
"We do use language intelligibly; 
So, language cannot be entirely "in 
flux". So, we can make some neces-
sary or permanent assertions about 
the meanings of words; 
So, not all of our knowledge of the 
world is contingent; 
So, not all of our knowledge of the 
world comes by 
way of the five senses alone." (Toul-
min, 1976, pp. 75-76). 
In science, our insurmountable pro-
blem is really that of the need for certainty. 
We like to understand and predict about 
the universe around us as it gives a cer-
tain sense of security and control. But 
is there really an actual certainty? "Is 
This City of Truth a Reality, or is it a 
mirage"? (Toulmin, 1976, p. 48). As 
Wallace has rather pungentally put it, 
"there is a bitch goddess or dog god against 
which we should declare. And her or 
his name is Certainty" (Wallace, 1988a). 
Pirsig in his eminently readable and 
influential book, "Zen and the Art of 
Motor Cycle Maintenance", mounts a 
concerted attack on the entire area of 
scientific truth. He discovers, for exam-
ple, that"thc time spans of scientific trutlis 
are an inverse function of the intensity of 
scientific effort" (Pirsig, 1974. p. 108) 
and : ''What shortens the life span of 
the existing truth is the volume of 
hypotheses offered to replace it;... as 
you try to move toward unchanging truth 
through the applications of scientific me-
thod, you actually do not move toward it 
at all. You move away from it ! ... it 
is science itself that is leaving mankind 
from single absolute truths to multiple, 
indeterminate, relative ones" (p. 109, ita-
lics in the original). It appears, thus that 
the scientific theories are not necessarily 
true, but are only convenint schemes of 
understanding the universe and its pheno-
mena and thus reduce uncertainties, and 
the question of arriving at final and last-
ing truths does not even arise. 
It is being recognized increasingly 
that alihough the inductive, empirical 
approach has well served acquisition of 
knowledge, it has important inherent limi-
tations and is not the only approach pos-
sible to science. 
"If all our knowledge comes from 
sensory data, what exactly is this subs-
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sensory data itself ?... If one accepts the 
premise that all our knowledge comes 
to us through our senses, Hume says, then 
one must logically conclude that both 
'Nature' and 'Nature's Laws' are crea-
tions of our own imagination" (Pirsig, 
1974, pp. 124-125). "It seems to me that 
the law of gravity has passed every test 
of non-existence there is. ... law of 
gravity exists nowhere except in people's 
heads! It's a ghost!" (Pirsig, 1974, p. 
33, italics in the original). He further 
adds : "It is not uncommon, . .. for Indian 
villagers to see ghosts. But they have a 
terrible time seeing the law of gravity." 
(p. 244). 
However, undeniably science does 
something useful. The scientific theories, 
surely have resulted in our ability to pre-
dict about and manipulate nature to our 
benefit. There is no doubt that there is 
such a thing as electricity which has been 
harvested and which I am using just now 
in addressing you. In addition, as has 
been pointed by Chalmers, (1976, p. 
108); 'Scientific theories have an objec-
tive structure outside of the minds of 
individual scientists." 
''Science exists in a particular society 
because it serves a specific function in that 
society" (Chalmers, 1976, p. 143). 
However, "The task for the 'science of 
mind' is not to discredit our experience 
of aesthetics, sensory, perception and the 
rest, rather, it is to bring to light the learn-
ing sequences and neural mechanism 
called into play in those activities" 
(Toulmin 1976, p. 277). 
CONCLUSION 
Wc have seen that much of our 
knowledge of the world around us, the 
external reality and nature comes through 
our s.-nse organs. This ability to perceive 
the external reality is the basis of the 
empirical, inductivist approach. Induc-
tion is also involved in the other scientific 
approaches, directly or indirectly, i.e., in 
falsificationism, paradigm approach and 
in intersectionalism. All these approa-
ches have problems. "Can we avoid the 
scylla of simplistic dogmatism and the 
charyoilis of epistemological anarchy?" 
(Wallace, 1988a). 
However, we have seen that our 
sensory apparatus is both limited and 
fallible. We can perceive only certain 
things and phenomena and not others. 
Pirsig (1974) raises a number of 
issues pertaining to the validity of the 
entire scientific process and scientific 
theories and truths. 
Science faces, furthermore, the pro-
blem that it is totally incapable of study-
ing certain important mental phenomena, 
at least "objectively", at the present time. 
How do you study or measure things such 
as the sense of joy that you experience at 
the mountain top or seashore? How do 
you study beauty, love and hatred, 
reverence and decision, faith and 
cynicism, patriotism, friendship, quality, 
excellence and dharma? The fact that 
we can not study them through the 
"scientific" method does not make these 
any the less important. As a matter of 
fact, we can even say the things that 
most importantly concern us, do not 
lend themselves to the scientific approach, 
science simply scratches the surface of the 
totality of the human situation. Science 
has been, and is useful, but it would be 
fatal to think that i t has answers to all or 
even the most important issues, at least 
at present. 
By the above, I am rot trying to run 
science down. Science has been useful 
in many ways and we are reaping the 
convenience and comfort resulting from 
it- However, its impact so far has been 
only on the physical environment. It 
has made little impact on our mental 
state and almost none on the spiritual. 
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perspective about the role of science in 
our everyday life. 
There is no a-priori reason for us to 
have absolute knowledge of the uxiverse 
in which we live. In the universe, only 
humans have some knowledge of it. Scien-
tific theories subserve useful functions to 
reduce uncertainties and fear and to help 
desirable action. However, it would be 
wrong to think that we know, or will 
know everything regarding the operations 
of nature. It is possible for us to draw 
only some conclusions about the exter-
nal reality—and most conclusions must 
remain tentative forever. 
The scientific theories have ranged 
from subjectivism to empiricism, and 
from rationalism to anarchy to nihilism. 
The Indian thought is more cogaisant of 
the limitations of knowledge. Indian 
philosophy is holistic, causality is not 
temporally linear, cause following effect. 
Furthermore, I would like to suggest that 
causality is multifactorial and interactive, 
based on the o igoing interaction between 
the various factors. 
So, whrre do we go ? It is not sugges-
ted by any means that we abandon science. 
Science is after all, in more general terms, 
our pursuit for knowledge. However, 
we need to assume a middle epistemolo-
gical position. Induction is thtre, but 
we need take it with some reservations. 
We need to develop and maintain toler-
ance for ambiguities, uncertainties; even 
contradicitions and opposites. We 
Indians, as it is, are less upset by these 
than the Western man with his analytical 
approach. The only possible position is 
for us to acknowledge our limitations. 
If that borders on intellectual nihilism, let 
it be so, for such are the ways of God. 
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